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Abstract
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In much of the standard corporate finance literature 
in which sovereign debt is treated as a risk free asset, 
corporate bond prices are seen to depend on idiosyncratic 
risk factors specific to the issuing company, with public 
debt playing an indirect role to the extent that it affects 
the term structure of interest rates. In the corporate 
world, however, the ability of a borrower to access 
international capital markets and the terms according 
to which it can raise capital depend not only on its own 
creditworthiness, but also on the financial health of its 
home-country sovereign. In times of financial stress, 
when investors lose confidence in the government’s 
ability to use public finances to stabilize the economy 
or provide a safety net for corporations in distress, 
markets’ assessment of private credit risk takes on a 
completely different dynamic than during normal times, 
incorporating an additional risk premium to compensate 
investors for the potential consequences of sovereign 
default. Using a new database that covers nearly every 
emerging-market corporate and sovereign entity that has 
This paper—a product of the Emerging Global Trends Division, Development Prospects  Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to to analyze the domestic growth and macroeconomic consequences of heightened sovereign debt stress, 
and to design appropriate policy measures to improve sovereign creditworthiness in order to prevent a loss in investor 
confidence that could trigger a panicky sell-off in sovereign debt with adverse macroeconomic and fiscal consequences. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at Mdailami@worldbank.org.  
issued bonds on global markets between 1995 and 2009, 
this paper investigates the degree to which heightened 
sovereign default risk perceptions during times of market 
turmoil influence the determination of corporate bond 
yield spreads, controlling for specific bond attributes 
and common global risk factors. Econometric evidence 
presented confirms that investors’ perceptions of 
sovereign debt problems translate into higher costs of 
capital for private corporate issuers, with the magnitude 
of such costs increasing at times when sovereign bonds 
trade at spreads exceeding a threshold of 1000 bps. The 
key policy recommendation emerging from the analysis 
relates to the need to improve sovereign creditworthiness 
in order to prevent a loss in investor confidence that 
could trigger a panicky sell-off in sovereign debt with 
adverse macroeconomic and fiscal consequences. 
Implications for future research point to the need to 
develop better models of corporate bond pricing and 
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Sovereign Debt Distress and Corporate Spillover Impacts 
 
   
I.  Introduction  
At a time when rising sovereign credit risk in highly indebted developed economies 
represents a major source of policy concern and market anxiety, drawing attention to the 
corporate debt problems that may loom ahead is not only a call for a more systematic approach to 
debt management, but an opportunity to highlight the hidden dynamics between sovereign and 
corporate debt that could create a negative feedback loop if investors lose confidence in the 
government’s ability to use public finances to stabilize the economy or provide a safety net for 
corporations in distress. Though such sovereign credit events are rare, with global financial 
markets still unsettled and public finances stretched to the limit in many countries, their 
likelihood is rising, even in countries with seemingly manageable external debt profiles. Under 
such circumstances, markets’ assessment of public and private credit risk takes on a completely 
different dynamic than during normal times, when markets’ belief in a government’s power of 
taxation and spending provides a cushion against macroeconomic shocks.  Understanding   such 
market dynamics is, thus, crucial in formulating mitigating policy support measures before 
investor fear sets in that could have adverse consequences for private firms’ access to foreign 
capital.   
  This paper investigates the degree to which heightened sovereign default risk perceptions 
during times of market turmoil—gauged by widening of bond market spreads beyond a critical 
threshold—influence the determination of corporate bond yield spreads in emerging markets. 
Using a new database that covers nearly every emerging-market corporate and sovereign entity 
that has issued bonds on global markets between 1995 and 2009 (4,441 transactions, amounting 
to $1.46 trillion), we develop an empirical methodology to analyze whether sovereign risk is 
priced into corporate bond spreads, controlling for specific bond attributes and common global 
risk factors. We model emerging corporate bond spreads as incorporating three risk premiums: 
corporate default, home-country sovereign debt distress, and a compensation for the fact that 
emerging bond market spreads vary systematically with global business cycle and with global 
financial market conditions. The first point, representing the standard credit risk component of 
corporate spreads, has received much attention in corporate finance literature, but the other two 
points are controversial and are based on two sets of considerations. First, private borrowing 
entities in emerging economies cannot insure the risk of their own home sovereigns through, for 
instance, selling protection in the credit derivatives swap (CDS) market; and second, emerging 
market investors are risk averse.    3 
 
Covering 59 countries and encompassing virtually all major emerging-market crises of 
past two decades,
2 our data set is sufficiently rich to allow a more rigorous investigation of the 
link between sovereign and corporate credit risk than has been possible thus far. Further, the 
unique character and nature of each of crises hitting emerging markets over the past two decades 
provides an additional degree of variance that allows identification of underlying economic 
mechanism and channels. A common string running through all these episodes has been intense 
risk aversion and consequent widening of bond spreads as investors have sold off emerging-
market assets in response to perceived local or global risk factors.  
In relying on market-based credit spreads, rather than occurrence of default to identify 
episodes of sovereign debt distress, our approach is consistent with the recent literature on the 
costs of sovereign default (Trebesch, 2009; Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch, 2010). This 
literature recognizes that while emerging-market borrowers have experienced several episodes of 
severe debt-servicing difficulties and market turmoil over the past two decades, the actual 
incidence of sovereign default, particularly on bond market obligations, has, in fact, been rare 
(Prescatori, and Sy, 2004).  Part of the reason why sovereign foreign debt servicing difficulties in 
emerging market economies have not necessarily resulted in default has to do with the advent and 
growth of the emerging-bond market in the 1990s, which has afforded borrowers in distress 
broader options for taking pre-emptive measures through debt restructuring and improved 
liability management (debt buybacks and swaps) to avoid the heavy costs of default (Mediros, 
Polan, and Ramlogan, 2007; Mendoza and Yue, 2008).  Another reason relates to the efforts 
undertaken by emerging sovereign borrowers to improve their external debt profiles through     
liability management and buyback and retiring of Brady bonds.
3 
Our paper  also takes into account the existing empirical literature on determinants of 
credit yield spreads, which has emphasized the “benchmark” status of sovereign debt in analyzing 
the spillover effect between sovereign and corporate bonds (Dittmer and Yuan, 2008; Yuan, 
2005). By virtue of the fact that corporate bonds are typically priced based on the existing 
sovereign curve, and that sovereign debt bears primarily macroeconomic risks, there exists a 
structural link between sovereign and corporate bonds, reinforced in the case of emerging-market 
economies by limited liquidity in the emerging-market asset class in general and in corporate 
assets in particular. We build upon this  literature  in two important respects: (i) recognizing the 
                                                 
2 The past two decades have not been short of emerging market crises. Mexico’s Tequila crisis of 1994–95, brought on 
by the devaluation of the peso; the 1998 Russian Gosudarstvennye Kratkosrochnye Obyazatel’stva (GKO) default, a 
sovereign debt crisis; and the 1997–98 East Asian crisis, which began as a balance of payments crisis under a fixed 
exchange rate regime in Thailand, all led to significant disruption in global financial markets. The 2002 economic crisis 
in Brazil and Turkey’s external debt problems, both of which were directly related to the market’s perception of 
political risk associated with general elections in these countries, also had negative effects on global markets. The 
2008–09 global financial crisis, though, was unique not only in its scope but in the fact that it originated in core 
financial markets and reverberated to emerging countries through a liquidity squeeze and flight to safety.  
 
3 At the same time, a country could face market turmoil and reversal of capital flows not because of its own fault, but 




spillover possibility from the sovereign  to corporate side and implementing an empirical 
methodology to confirm its importance; and (ii) using  bond  yield spreads  at issuance, rather 
than  the volume of issuance,  as the  main dependent variable in our  empirical analysis.   Though 
using offerings’ at-issue bond yield spreads has the advantage of better reflecting the state of 
investors’ sentiment and views, it has the drawback of introducing issuance timing endogeneity. 
A borrower’s decision to come to the market to raise capital is rarely an accident of fate, bur 
typically the product of a deliberate process of balancing the various costs and benefits involved. 
Success in raising capital depends on an array of factors: deal structure, distribution, marketing, 
jurisdiction and governing law, and the timing of coming to the market. Getting each of these 
factors right is important, as there are considerable reputational costs associated with an 
unfavorable market reaction, as illustrated powerfully by the drying up of emerging-market debt 
issuance in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section two highlights the growing importance 
of corporate debt in the external financial profile of emerging market economies and provides 
estimates of corporate debt refinancing coming due in the next few years; section three lays out a 
two-period model of corporate bond price valuation in the presence of sovereign risk to motivate 
our empirical analysis and reports our main results and findings; and section four concludes with 
a discussion of policy recommendations and key issues warranting future research and attention.  
 
II.  The Growing Importance of Emerging-Market Corporate Debt  
Increasing engagement of corporations from developing countries in global investment 
and finance has been a defining feature of financing of development in the first decade of 21st 
century. As sovereign demand for external financing declined in the majority of developing 
countries in  years leading to the crisis of 2008-09, market attention  shifted  to  the corporate 
sector—both public and private-- as  offering a new generation of EM  credit and equity products. 
In many respects, the market for emerging-market credit has shifted toward the corporate sector 
(encompassing both private and public entities), with implications for access to finance, debt 
sustainability, and long-term investment and growth. Over the decade leading up to the 2008–09 
crisis, the emerging-market corporate bond market had evolved quite smoothly into a robust, 
versatile, and active market offering considerable foreign funding opportunities across major 
currencies and jurisdictions to many blue-chip companies based in Latin America, Asia, and the 
Middle East. From 2002 to the end of 2007, 727 privately-owned emerging-market companies 
tapped international bond markets to raise a total of $336.7 billion of foreign debt capital. Easy 
financing conditions also facilitated access to the international syndicated loan market, with 1584 
emerging-market private firms going to overseas markets to raise a total of $640.4 billion of 
foreign-currency credit through 2,595 loans.  Easy Total foreign capital raised through bonds and 
syndicated loans during this period amounted to $977 billion, compared to $222.3 billion between 
1999 and 2001 (Figure 1). Many companies were borrowing primarily to finance oil and gas or 
banking operations or to fund aggressive cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) deals. 5 
 
Multinational companies based in emerging markets undertook more than 857-cross-border 
acquisition deals, worth $107 billion in 2008, up from 239 such deals in 2000, worth $12 billion. 
 
      Figure 1. Emerging-market private corporate debt 
 
      Data resources: Dealogic DCM Analytics  
 
In fact, private-sector borrowing in emerging markets grew during this period, 2002-
2007, at a much faster pace than public-sector borrowing, surging to account by 2007 for 69 
percent of total emerging market borrowings, while public-sector borrowing totaled about 31 
percent (Figures 2 and 3).  As emerging-market corporate borrowers are predominantly large 
private-sector firms in the banking, infrastructure, and mining industries with high growth 
potential, their access to overseas markets serves not only to underpin long-term growth and 
competitiveness, but also to afford policy makers greater scope to allocate domestic resources to 
high priority areas, such as investments in rural areas or small businesses, without crowding out 

















Figure 2. Emerging-market gross debt by sector 
 
Data resources: Dealogic DCM Analytics  
 
  
Figure 3. Emerging-market bond issuance, by sector 
 
 
Data resources: Dealogic DCM Analytics  
 
Emerging-market private firms’ large exposure to foreign-currency debt built up mostly 
during the boom years of 2002–07, has important implications for both debt sustainability and the 
design of international institutional arrangements for corporate debt restructuring and liability 
management. For much of the post-war era, sovereign financing has been the quintessential 
feature of emerging market finance, generating a whole body of market practice, credit risk 
assessment standards, international institutional arrangements for debt restructuring and dispute 


































pattern from  public to private  debt  in emerging market finance will bring to the fore, inevitably, 
a new set of policy  challenges, as well as  the need to develop  appropriate metric to measure  
and  evaluate  private corporate  risk exposure and default  probability. At the same time, several 
distinctive features of the 2008–09 financial crisis—the severity of the global business downturn, 
the scale of banks’ credit contraction, the precipitous drop in local equity markets, and the global 
nature of the crisis—implies a more arduous and extended debt restructuring cycle than was 
experienced following the 1997–98 East Asian crisis.  
 
The crisis hit the EM corporate sector hard  
 
Having been hard hit by the credit crunch and global recession, could the EM corporate 
sector regain its past momentum to become the dominant source of issuance in global bond 
markets? In countries with economies battered by a dramatic decline in exports, slumping local 
equity markets, and authorities pursuing tight domestic monetary policy while simultaneously 
allowing local currencies to depreciate to fend off external shocks, the corporate sector has borne 
the combined impacts of the global financial crisis and recession over the past two years. 
Relative to emerging-market sovereign bonds, spreads on foreign-currency emerging-
market corporate bonds spiked to much higher levels at the outset of the crisis and have remained 
much wider even after March 2009, when spreads on sovereign debt began to narrow. In the 
fourth quarter of 2008, emerging-market corporations were virtually locked out of bond markets 
(Figure 4). Especially in countries with economies battered by a dramatic decline in exports, 
slumping local equity markets, and authorities pursuing tight domestic monetary policy while 
simultaneously allowing local currencies to depreciate to fend off external shocks, the financial 
crisis hit the emerging-market corporate sector hard. The share of private corporate sector debt in 
total emerging-market bond issuance peaked at 58 percent in 2007 and has declined to about 33 
percent since the financial crisis. The share of sovereign debt issuance, on the other hand, has 
regained sharply since the crisis. 
  8 
 
     Figure 4: Emerging market private corporate bond issuance by quarter 
 
    Data source: Dealogic DCM analytics 
 
Large emerging-market corporate refinancing needs  
Corporations based in emerging markets now face the challenge of servicing their 
substantial debt obligations in an environment of sluggish global growth, high currency volatility, 
shrinking bank credit, and intensified competition from sovereign borrowers in advanced 
economies. Of the key drivers of emerging-market corporate bond issuance volume in the next 
few years, the need to refinance a large volume of foreign currency debt will be the strongest. 
Approximately $951 billion of emerging-market corporate debt is due to mature in the bond and 
bank loan markets between 2010 and 2013, with the bulk of that amount—about 75 percent—
originating from the syndicated loan market.  
Given the fragility of the international banking industry, a full rollover of emerging-
market bank loans seems unlikely, leaving bond markets to absorb a portion of such loans. 
Several factors will dictate the amount of maturing loans that make their way into bond markets: 
rating status, other available financing options (including those in equity markets), and loan-
specific characteristics and covenant clauses. Assuming 25 percent of borrowers with an 
investment-grade rating in their home countries decide to refinance in bond markets, issuance 
volumes originating from this source would be in the order of $54 billion in 2010, $46 billion in 
2011, and $30 billion in 2012.  
Pursuit of cross-border M&A as part of multinational companies’ growth and expansion 
strategies is also expected to contribute to the rebound in emerging-market corporate bond 
issuance in the coming years. While detailed data on the payments of M&A deals involving 



































share swaps, or credit—and it can be assumed that firms in emerging markets, with the major 
exception of state-owned Chinese firms, rely on bond markets to fund their transactions. The 
estimated amount of new issuances arising from demand for cross-border M&A, is expected to be 
$31 billion in 2010, $34 billion in 2011, and $37 billion in 2012.  
 
III.  Determinants of Emerging-Market Corporate Debt Spreads in the Presence 
of Sovereign Risk 
In the standard corporate bond valuation models of structural and reduced-form types 
dominating the literature in corporate finance in advanced countries (Merton, 1974; Black and 
Cox 1976; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; Duffie and Singleton, 
1999), sovereign debt is treated as a risk free asset, and traded in capital markets according to 
interest rate and not credit risks.  Accordingly corporate bond prices are poised to depend on 
idiosyncratic risk factors specific to the issuing company, with public debt playing an indirect 
role to the extent that it is believed to affect the term structure of interest rates. Thus, with 
concerns over sovereign creditworthiness assumed away, there seems little need to pay attention 
to the correlation between sovereign and corporate credit risk in the pricing of corporate bonds in 
advanced countries.   
For emerging markets, as indeed for highly indebt advanced countries, the question of 
how sovereign credit risk affects corporate sector borrowing in international markets commands 
explicit attention, as sovereign credit risk has been an inherent characteristic feature of the  whole 
asset class and how investors have come to conduct trade and form views.  From its inception in 
early 1990s, the emerging sovereign bond market has been viewed and priced as a risky asset, 
comparable in many ways to the US high-yield bond asset class. As is well documented, the 
market’s advent in the early 1990s is traced to the conversion of problem bank loans into 
collateralized marketable bond instruments under the Brady plan.  Thus, a key priority in research 
on the determinants of corporate credit spreads in emerging markets is the question of how 
sovereign risk perceptions are likely to shape the terms of corporate access to international capital 
markets.   
The channels by which rising sovereign credit risk concerns spill over to the corporate 
side are basically three. The first is the possibility of reduced liquidity as growing market 
concerns about a country’s sovereign debt lead to a drop in risk appetite across all debt issuers of 
that country. In turn, investors’ perception of greater systemic sovereign risk translates 
into higher risk premiums, which must be added to the price of emerging-market 
corporate securities offered on overseas markets. This mechanism is likely to be operative in 
emerging markets with large corporate external debt refinancing needs—particularly those 
refinancing from the international banking market, where liquidity conditions, despite significant 
easing since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, remain highly vulnerable to 10 
 
bank balance sheet and funding pressures. With and as much as $951 billion of emerging-market 
corporate debt maturing over 2010 to 2014, the risk posed by reduced liquidity is serious and 
warrants attention, especially in Europe, as the lion’s share of emerging-market corporate external 
debt exposure resides with European banks.  
    The second mechanism through which sovereign credit risk can spill over to the 
corporate side relates to fiscal space and the fact that highly indebted governments have less 
scope to use fiscal policy to provide a cushion for corporate borrowers to fall back in an 
environment of constrained credit.  In practice, this means that emerging-market governments are 
limited in their ability to offer the guarantees that are generally required for major corporate debt 
restructurings, such as in the recent case of Naftogaz in Ukraine.  
Third, fiscal adjustment in countries with high levels of government debt can lead to 
substantial spillover effects between sovereign and corporate debt, as tight fiscal policy can have 
negative real economy consequences, thereby adversely affecting corporate earnings and 
profitability. Within the corporate sector, it is the banking that is most susceptible to sovereign 
stress, as banks’ funding costs rise with sovereign spreads due to the perception that domestic 
banks hold typically a large volume of government securities in their balance sheets and that 
government guarantees are worth less in an environment of sovereign stress. 
The fact that most emerging-market firms tapping international debt markets are large 
and relatively highly leveraged raises the possibility that corporate debt distress could also spill 
over to the sovereign side, as corporations in distress (both financial and non-financial) may 
require government support either directly or indirectly through governments involvement in the 
process of corporate debt restructuring and workouts. While actual corporate default in emerging 
economies was relatively contained during the financial crisis, the large volume of external 
corporate debt outstanding and its complex profile continue to remain a source of worry and 
concern.  The spillover effects and the direction of causality between the corporate and sovereign 
sides are investigated in the following section by jointly estimating equations for the determinants 
of sovereign and corporate bond yield spreads at issuance. 
Analytical framework  
As an illustration of how sovereign risk can affect the corporate bond market, we begin 
with a highly simplified model of corporate bond price valuation in a two-period model that 
incorporates both corporate and sovereign risk.  The approach is in the spirit of the Merton (1974) 
structural model, with the added complexity that the firm’s cash flows are contingent not only on 
its own investment in real assets, but also on the financial health of its home country government. 
In the presence of sovereign risk, investors’ assessment of the firm’s securities depend on both 
the firm’s specific factors and the probability that the sovereign runs into financial problems that 
bear on the firm’s ability and capacity to service its debt obligations.  11 
 
More formally, consider a firm issuing a bond with face value F dollars at time t=0 to 
invest in a project with a random cash flow X dollars (in foreign currency equivalence) to be 
realized at time 1. We define X to include liquidation value of assets but net of operating costs. 
The debt contract is a fixed obligation which promises to pay $D (which includes interest and 
principal) at time t=1. To incorporate sovereign risk, a random variable Z is defined, which takes, 
for simplicity, two alternative values: first, Z =1 with the probability p, indicating that the 
sovereign is in financial distress;  and second, Z =0 , with the probability 1-p, indicating that the 
sovereign is solvent. In the incidence of sovereign distress, the firm’s ability to service its debt 
obligation on a timely manner is adversely affected by a combination of factors—an economy- 
wide downturn, tightening of external liquidity conditions, exchange rate depreciation and/or 
exchange rate controls—and of which can translate into a downward shift in the firm’s cash flow 
distribution.  
 With this setup, the payoff to bond holders,    , will be a function of both sovereign and 
corporate risks, expressed as: 
            , ,      
min  ,         1
 min  ,         0
                (1) 
where 0     1 , and min  ,      
           
             
                                     (2)    
In the general case where X (project cash flow) and variable Z, are not independent, 
conditional distributions are not identical. Further, it is assumed that distributions of both 
variables are both normal with means   ,   , and variances   
 ,   
 . Thus, the expected return to 
the bondholders can be expressed as follows:             
                    |  0    
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where f1(x) and f2(x) are the conditional density probability functions of     under the two scenarios of 
Z=0 and Z=1, respectively. 12 
 
 Equation (3) describes the expected value of the return to the bondholders as a weighted 
average of the expected values calculated separately for the cases when the government is in 
distress or not, with the weights reflecting the respective probabilities of such events. 
Under the assumption that creditors are risk-neutral, the market price of the corporate 
debt V is the present value of E Y   , discounted at the international risk-free rate of interest, r. 
That is: 
V  
E Y   
1 r
 
    (4) 
 
 To assess how corporate bond price depends on sovereign default risk, we simulate 
equation (4) for different parameter values. Figure 5 shows a simulated value of a corporate 
bond price, V, for various sovereign default risk values. The simulation study was carried out 
under the following assumptions and parameter values: the share of foreign currency loan paid 
back in the case of country default (α) is set to 60 percent; the corporate cash flow follows a 
normal distribution, as depicted in Figure 6; and the standard deviation is set at 25 but is 
increased by 30 percent if the country defaults. The payment obligation was obtained by 
applying an interest rate of 7.5 percent to the debt face value of 100. It is interesting to note 
how sensitive V is with regard to the variation in the probability of sovereign default. Raising p 
(the probability of sovereign default) from 2.8 percent (corresponding to a credit default swap 
[CDS] spread of 120 basis points) to 23.8 points (corresponding to a CDS spread of 820 basis 
points) will result in a decrease in corporate bond price of 9 percent. 
 
  13 
 
Figure 5. Price of corporate bond issued with a face value of 100 to finance 
a project with debt/equity ratio of 5:1  
 
 
Figure 6. Probability distribution of project cash flow under two sovereign 
default scenarios  
 
  
























Figure 7. Price of Greek corporate and sovereign bonds
 
Econometric methodology and specification 
When pricing emerging market bond securities issued internationally, investors take into 
account many risk factors.  Investors generally make a distinction between bonds issued by public 
sector entities (government and government-owned companies) and those offered by private 
borrowers, while taking into account common factors such as the state of the home country 
macroeconomy, global financial market conditions, and bond- and firm-specific factors (maturity, 
currency of denomination, jurisdiction, covenants, sector, and the fact that corporate ratings are 
often subject to sovereign ceilings). Reflecting the influence of such factors, investors typically 
attach a higher risk premium to the private rather than public bond instruments.  
   Formally, our analysis of the relationship between sovereign and corporate risk centers 
on the following set of regressions , specifying t sovereign and corporate bond spreads at issuance 
as a function of offering terms; currency and jurisdiction; industry; and various macroeconomic 
economic, financial, and institutional control variables for each issuer’s home country. 
 
Sovereign spreads are given by: 
  ,        ,      
         
        
         (5) 
 
Corporate spreads are given by: 
  ,        ,      
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where Ys,ijt and Yc,ijt  are vectors with elements {Ys,ijt , Yc,ijt}. The subscripts s and c refer 
respectively to sovereign and corporate, and “ijt” refers to bond i issued in country j at 
time t, where: 
        Xjt  denotes systematic (macroeconomic) factors 
        Vt  denotes global risk factors 
        Zi  denotes bond-specific features         
        W  denotes firm-specific characteristics 
 
 
Our formal econometric analysis  of correlation risk between emerging market private 
corporate borrowers and their home-sovereigns is based on a large sample of 4,441 bond issuance 
denominated in U.S. dollars or euros offered by the government, public corporations, and private 
corporations from 59 emerging economies between 1995 and 2009 (see Annex I for the list of 
countries).  Our sample represents a wide cross section of issues by country, industry, and bond 
attributes, the latter of which includes maturity, amount, coupon, rating, and applicable law and 
jurisdiction. The summary statistics for the universe of all bonds are reported in Table 1. Thus, 
total capital raised amounted to $1.4 trillion, with the bulk (80 percent) of new capital raised 
coming from dollar denominated bonds, and the rest from euro denominated bonds. We refer to 
sovereign bonds as bonds issued by governments, government agencies and public corporations 
whose payments are guaranteed explicitly by governments.  Such bonds account for 60 percent of 
total issuance volume, but only 40 percent of deal numbers, reflecting their much larger deal size.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of emerging-market sovereign and corporate bond issuances: 1995–2009 
 






  In USD    In EURO  
Average 
amount 









Sovereign issuers  1,711  866.6  649.2  217.4  506.5  283.5  9.1  BBB- 
     Government  949  577.9  410.2  167.7  608.9  339.9  9.8  BB+ 
     Public corporate  762  288.7  239  49.7  378.9  213.3  7.2  BBB+ 
Private corporate  2,730  596.7  537  59.6  218.6  310.7  6.5  BBB- 
                             
Total  4,441  1,463.3  1,186.3  277  329.5  300.2  7.3  BBB- 
 
Several other distinct differences between emerging market sovereign and private 
corporate bonds, as highlighted in Table 1, deserve attention.  Sovereign bonds tend to be larger 
in size, carry lower at –issue spreads, and issued in longer maturity than private corporate bonds.  
Such differences in bond attributes reflect several distinct characteristic differences between 
private corporate and sovereign borrowers in emerging market economies. First, corporate 
entities face higher information barriers and greater market constraints than sovereigns that derive 
advantages from membership in multilateral financial institutions and from the state-centric 16 
 
nature of the international economic order. Second, even locally creditworthy firms may be 
constrained for several reasons. Corporate ratings are often subject to sovereign ceilings. 
Corporate assets are not easily amenable to collateralization in international debt markets. Swap 
markets for credit derivatives are better developed and more liquid for emerging sovereign names 
than for corporate names.  And, private corporate borrowers’ relations and interactions, regarding 
default or debt restructuring, with foreign creditors are largely shaped by economic 
considerations, whereas sovereigns’ relations are driven by a mix of politics and economics in 
mind.  
 
Estimation results  
We begin with estimating equations (5) and (6) separately to establish empirically the 
structural differences between private and sovereign bond markets in emerging market 
economies. The dependent variable in both set of equations is at –issue spread, quoted in basis 
points and measured as the bond’s offering spread over the yield of a maturity –matched U.S. 
Treasury security or, in the case of a euro issue, a comparable German Bunds obligation.  The 
primary data sources are Dealogic DCM Analytics and Bloomberg, with filling in missing data by 
the author. To capture common local and global systematic risk factors, we include data on the 
macroeconomic, institutional, financial market development of each issuer’s home country, along 
with data on international interest rates that we match by month, quarter, or year with the issue 
from a variety of sources.  We also control for the state of global investor sentiment to account 
for common shocks affecting both private and public bond markets. We use the bond issuers’ 
general industry group defined by dialogic DCM analytics to control the sector of issuers. Tables 
2 and 3 summarize estimation results for public and private bond spread determinants, 
respectively, with country fixed effects and under alternative model specifications. 
   17 
 
 Table 2: Regression results for determinants of emerging market sovereign bond spreads 
 
   Model 1  Model2   Model3 
Local Macroeconomic variables          
GDP growth rate  -8.34  -7.19  -7.56 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
GDP per capita  -4.82  -3.44  -4.50 
   (0.000)***  (0.002)***  (0.000)*** 
Inflation  131.59  137.73  140.15 
   (0.010)***  (0.007)***  (0.005)*** 
Private credit/GDP  -0.61  -0.49  -0.51 
   (0.167)  (0.266)  (0.248) 
Fiscal balance/ GDP  -1.08  -2.39  -1.36 
   (0.493)  (0.132)  (0.382) 
Exports/GDP  1.08  1.84  1.42 
   (0.169)  (0.019)**  (0.069)* 
Foreign bank claims/GDP  1.45  1.50  1.36 
   (0.066)*  (0.058)*  (0.083)* 
Country credit risk rating index  15.55  15.87  15.28 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Country financial crisis dummy         80.73 
         (0.000)*** 
Global factors          
US 10 year treasury bond yield (BP)  -0.20  -0.16  -0.18 
   (0.003)***  (0.018)**  (0.005)*** 
US 10 year T-bond yield — 2 year T-bond yield  17.79  15.30  17.82 
   (0.001)***  (0.007)***  (0.001)*** 
Volatility 
(1)  42.64     38.76 
   (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
World Industrial production index, Y-O-Y growth     -9.487    
      (0.000)***    
Bond attributes          
Euro denominated bond  -6.05  -6.98  -6.96 
   (0.576)  (0.519)  (0.515) 
Log (maturity)  -4.73  -6.39  -2.90 
   (0.463)  (0.320)  (0.650) 
Log (value)  -6.94  -7.81  -5.60 
   (0.108)  (0.070)*  (0.190) 
Floating rate notes  -94.10  -95.66  -93.13 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Guarantee  22.39  15.41  25.82 
   (0.106)  (0.266)  (0.060)* 
Eurobond  0.63  1.92  0.24 
   (0.952)  (0.855)  (0.982) 
Rule 144A  -6.44  -3.09  -6.50 
   (0.523)  (0.760)  (0.515) 
Non negative-pledge issuer  10.57  11.99  10.73 
   (0.211)  (0.158)  (0.199) 
Bond rating at launch  13.87  13.54  14.02 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
           
Country effects (not reported here)          
Observations  1087  1087  1087 
R-squared  0.71  0.71  0.72 
 
Note: p values in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%: 
1) Our volatility indicator is derived from a detail factor analysis of several indicators, VIX, commodity prices (agriculture, energy, and 




Table 3:  Regression results for determinants of emerging market private corporate bond spreads 
   Model 1  Model2   Model3 
Local Macroeconomic variables          
GDP growth rate  -11.34  -8.73  -10.48 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.68  0.60  -0.39 
   (0.581)  (0.629)  (0.752) 
Inflation  199.40  213.02  200.96 
   (0.016)**  (0.010)**  (0.015)** 
Private credit/GDP  0.00  -0.06  -0.01 
   (0.994)  (0.920)  (0.983) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  -0.65  -2.65  -1.10 
   (0.725)  (0.158)  (0.554) 
Exports/GDP  2.02  2.54  2.07 
   (0.045)**  (0.012)**  (0.040)** 
Foreign bank claims/GDP  1.02  1.47  1.04 
   (0.353)  (0.179)  (0.342) 
Country credit risk rating index  17.89  16.06  17.32 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Country financial crisis dummy         58.8410  
         (0.004)*** 
Global factors          
US 10 year treasury bond yield (BP)  -0.29  -0.26  -0.31 
   (0.000)***  (0.002)***  (0.000)*** 
US 10 year T-bond yield — 2 year T-bond yield  24.03  25.80  23.41 
   (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Volatility 
(1)  43.79     42.05 
   (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
World Industrial production index, Y-O-Y growth     -11.00    
      (0.000)***    
Bond attributes          
Euro denominated bond  -15.51  -17.60  -15.91 
   (0.355)  (0.294)  (0.341) 
Log (maturity)  8.81  8.39  9.13 
   (0.158)  (0.179)  (0.143) 
Log (value)  -31.52  -32.25  -31.25 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Floating rate notes  -114.39  -116.15  -112.26 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Guarantee  17.53  18.85  17.52 
   (0.090)*  (0.069)*  (0.090)* 
Eurobond  -0.29  4.30  1.86 
   (0.981)  (0.727)  (0.880) 
Rule 144A  33.19  35.36  34.02 
   (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Non negative-pledge issuer  35.05  36.14  34.74 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Bond rating at launch  26.02  26.12  26.65 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Sector          
Finance  -34.75  -32.57  -35.21 
   (0.003)***  (0.005)***  (0.002)*** 
Oil & Gas  -52.54  -56.29  -54.30 
   (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
Mining  -90.20  -99.04  -87.77 
   (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.004)*** 
Utility & Energy  -75.03  -68.22  -72.33 
   (0.003)***  (0.007)***  (0.004)*** 
Country effects (not reported here)          
Number of observations  1427  1427  1427 
R-squared  0.65  0.64  0.65 19 
 
Note: p values in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%:           
The results confirm the view that the emerging sovereign bond market is distinctly     
different from that of private corporate market in many respects that go beyond differences in 
bond attributes such as size, maturity, currency of denomination and ratings. Controlling for such 
attributes, sovereign bonds are more responsive to changes in local macroeconomic conditions 
than private corporate bonds. This result is consistent with Dittmar and Yuan (2008) argument 
that sovereign bonds bear only macroeconomic risks, while corporate bonds are driven by both 
macroeconomic and firm-specific risk factors.  
Regarding the determinants of private corporate spreads, results reported in Table 3     
support the importance of bond specific characteristics, domestic macroeconomic factors, as well 
as global risk factors.  Local macroeconomic factors affect investors’ perceptions largely through 
their assessment of corporate profitability and cash flows that depend on local economic 
conditions such as growth performance, inflation, degree of trade openness, and access to local 
finance.  Of particular interest is the role of domestic growth on foreign investors’ perception of 
corporate risk. The estimation results demonstrate that investors attach considerable importance 
to prospects for economic growth in the home country of companies whose securities they are 
considering purchasing. In contrast, inflation in the home country increases bond spreads by 
making the issuer’s domestic operations more risky. Second, emerging private firms based in 
countries with a well-developed banking system (i.e.: high ratio of private credit to GDP) pay 
significantly less to issue debt. These results confirm anecdotal evidence and previous findings 
that local financial development has a major role in facilitating access to global capital markets 
for emerging market firms. 
Third, the level of economic development, measured by per -capita income is significant 
and of the right sign, indicating that countries with higher level of economic development pay 
less for foreign capital.  One explanation for this result is that it is possible that per-capita income 
is serving as a proxy for a country’s institutional development and related corporate governance 
and transparency indicators.  
Spillover impacts from sovereign to corporate sector  
Analyzing the spillover from the sovereign to the private corporate side, we define a set 
of country-specific crisis dummies to identify episodes of sovereign debt distress: 
       
1                                                                             
__
0                                              _ _
 
 
In  relying on  secondary market indicators, rather than the actual incidence of default to  
define episodes of  sovereign debt distress, we follow  recent literature difficulties  (Pescatori, and 
Sy, 2004) in  recognizing  the role of capital market development, domestic  macroeconomic 20 
 
improvements in debtor countries  along with  important  reforms in  sovereign bond contracts 
and  documentation  in  international capital markets –such as the shift in adopting collective 
actions clauses (CACs)  in sovereign bond contracts under  New York Law– in  reducing  the 
actual incidence of default on foreign currency debt obligations. Thus, according to Standard  and 
Poor’s, there have been only fourteen foreign–currency sovereign defaults in developing 
countries  – Argentina, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  Grenada, Indonesia, Paraguay, 
Russia, Seychelles, and Venezuela – over the past decade, even though  the decade has  seen 
waves  of financial, banking  and currency  crises.   
The consideration  that  sovereign debt distress can  have  expressions in a broader range 
of  policy  and  official rescue outcomes  along with  the  backward looking  nature of credit 
ratings  provide the  reasons  for  using   secondary  market bond spreads  to capture  sovereign 
debt-servicing  problems. Accordingly, for a sovereign borrower, we define episodes of debt 
distress as when its bonds trade at spreads of at least 1000 bps over the comparable U.S.   
Treasury securities. This definition captures the periods that countries were classified by Standard 
and Poor’s as being in selective default (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Sovereign selective default episodes and spreads on the foreign-currency bond markets 
                       
Country 
Secondary market 
default spread (bps) 
  Selective default date    Emergence date    Time in selective 
default 
Argentina  5,320     November 6, 2001  June 1, 2005     43 months 
Dominican Rep.  616     February 1, 2005  June 29, 2005     5 months 
Ecuador  3,654     December 15, 2008  June 15, 2009     6 months 
Russia  2,537     January 27, 1999  December 8, 2000     22 months 
Uruguay  929     May 16, 2003  June 2, 2003     1 month 
Venezuela*  446     January 18, 2005  March 3, 2005     1½ month 
Average  2,250  13 months 
 
Source: Default information is based on "Sovereign Defaults And Rating Transition Data, 2009 Update", Standard and Poors, March 
17, 2010; sovereign spreads from J.P. Morgan EMBI Global 
 
(*) In the case of Venezuela, there was a debate at the time among credit agencies; evidently investors did not react to S&P downgrade
 
We run a set of regressions with interactions between the systematic component of 
sovereign spreads (estimated from equation 5) and our country-specific crisis dummies using: 
   ,        ,      
         
        
        
                                         (7) 
where:               ,       
    , and the results are reported in Table 5.  
As seen from Table 5, the estimated coefficient SSR is positive and statically significant, 
even with the presence of domestic macroeconomic variables in the equation explaining the 
determinants of private corporate bond market spreads in emerging economies.  Interacting SSR 
with the country crisis dummy variable provides a measure of the degree to which sovereign risk 
affects private external borrowing capital costs during times of sovereign debt distress and 
financial crises.  In all equations reported in Table 5, the estimated coefficient is also positive and 
significant.   
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Table 5: Empirical Analysis of Spillover effects from sovereign to private corporate sector 
   Model1  Model2  Model3 
SSR          
Sovereign Systematic risk(SSR)  0.97  0.74  0.78 
   (0.067)*  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
SSR*country crisis dummy  0.10  0.12  0.11 
   (0.026)**  (0.011)**  (0.015)** 
Local Macroeconomic variables          
GDP growth rate  -3.474       
   (0.477)       
GDP per capita  2.83       
   (0.207)       
Inflation  69.12       
   (0.532)       
Private credit/GDP  0.49       
   (0.383)       
Fiscal balance/GDP  1.32       
   (0.573)       
Exports/GDP  1.78       
   (0.842)       
Foreign bank claims/GDP  0.21       
   (0.878)       
Country credit risk rating index  -0.43       
   (0.340)       
Global factors          
US 10 year treasury bond yield (BP)  -0.31  -0.38  -0.39 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
US 10 year T-bond yield — 2 year T-bond yield  23.24  22.86  16.77 
   (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.006)*** 
Volatility 
(1)  43.21     48.532 
   (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
Bond attributes          
Euro denominated bond  -16.15  -15.24  -12.16 
   (0.335)  (0.365)  (0.465) 
Log (maturity)  9.12  7.62  8.84 
   (0.143)  (0.226)  (0.156) 
Log (value)  -31.37  -30.91  -30.24 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Floating rate notes  -113.09  -115.45  -112.58 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Guarantee  17.43  13.01  11.04 
   (0.092)*  (0.208)  (0.280) 
Eurobond  0.94  12.11  5.94 
   (0.939)  (0.321)  (0.624) 
Rule 144A  33.43  36.34  32.69 
   (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Non negative-pledge issuer  34.58  32.97  31.59 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Bond rating at launch  26.50  25.42  26.03 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Sector          
Finance  -35.29  -37.79  -39.55 
   (0.002)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Oil & Gas  -54.21  -54.74  -56.16 
   (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.001)*** 
Mining  -88.36  -99.50  -90.30 
   (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** 
Utility & Energy  -73.32  -75.03  -76.83 
   (0.004)***  (0.003)***  (0.002)*** 
Country effects (not reported here)          
Observations  1427  1427  1427 
R-squared  0.65  0.63  0.64 
Note: p values in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%:        23 
 
IV.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In the corporate world, the ability of a borrower to access international capital markets 
and the terms according to which it can raise capital depend not only on its own     
creditworthiness, but also on the investors’ views and risk perceptions of the country in which the 
borrower is domiciled.  For corporate borrowers in advanced countries, country risk has not 
traditionally figured importantly, given their governments’ high credit rating status and the 
associated perceived institutional strength of rule of law, transparency and corporate governance 
considerations. In contrast, for private corporate borrowers in emerging economies, country risk 
or its synonymous sovereign default risk has been a fact of life.  From its advent in early 1990s, 
the market for emerging bonds, in both sovereign and corporate segments, has functioned as 
incorporating an important element of sovereign risk, which has been impounded in corporate 
spreads as an additional cost of corporate access to international capital markets.   
In this paper, we explore how debt distress can potentially affect the costs of private 
corporate external borrowing in emerging market economies, using primary bond market spreads 
that reflect more accurately the actual cost of capital to emerging borrowers than the more 
commonly used secondary market spreads. We develop an analytical framework for thinking 
about the correlation between sovereign and corporate credit risk and provide tentative evidence 
on the size of additional capital costs that private borrowers bear in times of sovereign debt 
distress. The sources of such a correlation are several and could vary from country to country. 
One important source could be the fact that both the firm and its home-government operate in the 
same domestic macroeconomic and global environment, and thus periods of economic downturns  
that heighten  the firm’s  probability of default worsen  also  the government’s  fiscal  situation 
and hence its capacity to service its debt.  The second source is the fact that the government’s 
ability to provide emergency support to private firms in distress is compromised when its own 
credit quality is in question.  The third source could be that in many countries local banks hold a 
large volume of government securities on their books and thus in times of high sovereign default 
risk the ability of banks to provide finance to private firms is eroded.   
An important policy recommendation emerging from our analysis relates to the need to 
improve sovereign creditworthiness in order to prevent a loss in investor confidence that could 
lead to a panicky sell-off in sovereign debt with adverse macroeconomic and fiscal consequences. 
Econometric evidence presented in the paper confirms that investors’ perceptions of sovereign 
debt problems in an emerging economy translate into higher costs of capital for that country’s 
private corporate issuers, with the magnitude of such costs increasing at times when sovereign 
bonds trade at spreads exceeding a threshold of 1000 bps. This reinforces the need for paying 
greater attention to the domestic costs of sovereign default in the ongoing debt sustainability work 
promoted by major international financial institutions. It also emphasizes the salience of domestic 
growth costs of sovereign debt in explaining the feasibility of sovereign debt as opposed to the 24 
 
theories of reputation and punishment pioneered by the influential works of Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981), and Bulow and Rogoff (1989). 
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ANNEX I:  Emerging market countries with sovereign and corporate 
bond market spreads 
 
Argentina  Hungary     Philippines 
Azerbaijan  India     Poland    
Bahrain  Indonesia     Qatar    
Belarus  Jamaica     Romania    
Brazil  Jordan     Russian Federation 
Bulgaria  Kazakhstan    Saudi Arabia 
Chile  Kenya     Slovak Republic 
China  Kuwait     Slovenia    
Colombia  Latvia     South Africa 
Costa Rica  Lebanon     South Korea 
Croatia  Lithuania     Sri Lanka 
Czech Republic  Malaysia     Thailand    
Dominican Republic  Mexico     Trinidad and Tobago 
Ecuador  Mongolia     Turkey    
Egypt  Morocco     Ukraine    
El Salvador  Nigeria     United Arab Emirates 
Estonia  Oman     Uruguay    
Georgia  Pakistan     Venezuela 
Ghana  Panama     Vietnam    
Guatemala  Peru          
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